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Executive Summary 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone is an exceptional outbreak that 
has blurred the lines between health and humanitarian crises. In so doing, it has highlighted 
numerous problems with regard to the overall coordination of humanitarian disasters that have 
public health implications of international consequence. This in turn has prompted a number of 
high-level intergovernmental reviews of the key actors, institutions and systems that we - as an 
international community - currently rely upon. At the time of writing, a number of these reviews 
are yet to hand down their findings. This study, which was funded by the University of Sydney, 
seeks to provide some preliminary independent insights into the civil-military response and 
overall coordination of the Ebola outbreaks in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also seeks to offer 
some recommendations to inform future research and response efforts. 
The domestic health systems of Liberia and Sierra Leone were ill-equipped to address the size 
and scale of the Ebola outbreak. Overwhelmed, rapid international assistance was needed to 
halt the further spread of the virus and save lives. Unfortunately, however, the international 
civilian response to this crisis was widely perceived as slow and inadequate. While key 
institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) have been heavily criticized, the 
role of non-government organizations (NGOs) was also mixed. A small number of non-state 
actors and NGOs such as Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) reacted swiftly and appropriately to 
the outbreak, but the majority of other NGOs found themselves unprepared for a crisis of this 
nature, withdrawing personnel and closing down operations. This raises serious concerns about 
the overall capacity of the existing humanitarian system and agencies to respond to significant 
health-related crises.  
The 2014 Ebola outbreak witnessed the deployment of thousands of military personnel to help 
contain the outbreak. The majority of respondents interviewed for the purposes of this study 
were positive about the role of foreign armed forces, which were seen as a necessary last 
resort in an emergency. Sierra Leoneans were also generally positive about the role of the 
domestic armed forces, which played a larger role in the Ebola response than their Liberian 
counterparts. Equally though, several criticisms and concerns also emerged. In the context of 
the foreign armed forces this related primarily to their perceived risk aversion and the 
timeliness of constructing Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs). Criticism of the domestic armed forces 
included the threat - and in some instances alleged use - of violence and intimidation.  
Strong leadership from the President and the health sector in Liberia was recognised as key to 
the country’s effective response, whereas weak leadership and patronage within the health 
sector was seen as a limit to the efficacy of the Sierra Leone response. Lack of government 
trust undermined public health, inhibited behaviour change and social awareness campaigns, 
particularly in Sierra Leone. 
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Key Recommendations 
1. That the terms of reference for the United Nations High-Level Panel on Global Response 
to Health Crises be expanded to include civil-military cooperation as part of the 
broader review of the international crisis response system. 
2. Substantial international investment - informed by empirical evidence and frameworks 
such as the International Health Regulations (2005) - must be immediately scaled-up to 
address existing capacity gaps in disaster management and outbreak response. 
3. Governments should cite the 2014 Ebola outbreak to advocate for greater resources 
to address the capacity gaps in their national health systems. This includes leveraging 
support from international actors to secure the requisite technical and financial support 
to build local capacity. 
4. Framing an issue as a health crisis should not preclude multi-sectoral collaboration with 
humanitarian and if necessary military actors, and, when a health crisis becomes a 
humanitarian crisis the health aspect should not be lost. 
5. Develop additional evidence-informed criteria to facilitate multi-level risk assessments 
that can be used to guide civil-military responses to health-related humanitarian crises 
so as to avoid exacerbating the risks of harmful and unintended consequences.  
6. The United Nations to commission a five-year independent research program that 
systematically investigates the roles and functions that military-based actors can 
perform in collaboration with civilian authorities in health-related humanitarian crises 
to inform future practice. 
7. The United Nations develop in collaboration with leading non-government and 
humanitarian agencies a training program for military and civilian actors to enhance 
preparedness, build awareness, and ensure greater reciprocal understanding of 
appropriate roles, principles and practices for responding to health-related 
humanitarian crises. 
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Methodology  
The purpose of this study was to examine the civil-military response to the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The study was funded by the Marie Bashir Institute for 
Infectious Diseases and Biosecurity and the Centre for International Security Studies based at 
the University of Sydney, and the research was conducted by a small multidisciplinary team 
drawn from the University of Sydney, Queen Mary University of London, and the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The study received full ethics approval from the 
University of Sydney and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and fieldwork 
was conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone in March and April 2015. Additional research in 
the US will be conducted in August 2015.  
Primary data was collected through interviews, structured around a common set of research 
questions (Appendix A). A combination of qualitative research methods were used to evaluate 
the crucial tasks, relationships, duties and responsibilities of the civilian and armed forces 
engaged in containing the spread of Ebola in West Africa. These included literature reviews, 
semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation, and discourse analysis. Participants 
were identified through stakeholder mapping, self-nomination, and snowball sampling. Formal 
written or verbal consent was obtained from all participants. Given the sensitivity of some 
issues, all quotations have been anonymized to protect identities. 
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Literature Review 
The majority of scholarship examining civil-military relations could be considered to fall into 
two broad categories. The first category is principally concerned with domestic civil-military 
relations. Within this literature, issues under investigation primarily revolve around such topics 
as civilian oversight and control of the military, the risk of conflict between parties leading to 
unintended outcomes (i.e. military coups), and the importance of democratic governance and 
accountability.1 Accordingly, the focus is on the bargain that exists and/or that is periodically 
renegotiated between three groups of actors - the general population, the government, and 
the military - with various theories emphasising differing institutional, sociological, or agential 
considerations on whether the military is performing and behaving as intended.2  
A second category of literature on civil-military relations has emerged in the wake of the Cold 
War. This literature emphasizes the importance of particular norms such as the ‘responsibility to 
protect’, gender ‘mainstreaming’, etc., and is principally concerned with changing military 
practices and roles in international stability and reconstruction operations.3 Importantly, within 
this expansive and growing literature the role of military personnel within health-related 
activities (and corresponding concepts such as ‘health as bridge for peace’) has remained 
especially controversial, with actors claiming a raft of unintended consequences arising from 
what is perceived as a ‘blurring’ of lines between civilian and military actors.4 These extend 
from compromising traditional humanitarian principles, questions regarding the sustainability 
(and concomitant consequences) of any interventions, to the kidnapping and murder of 
humanitarian workers. Within the military, opinions also remain divided on the appropriateness 
of military-operations-other-than-war (MOOTWs), with some highlighting that such activities 
are not ‘core business’ and should be discarded in light of fiscal tightening.5 As a result, prior 
to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa there was no clear consensus on the 
appropriateness of civil-military cooperation in health-related humanitarian crises. 
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Research Findings 
International Civilian Actors 
‘International civilian actors’ refers to all intergovernmental, governmental, and non-
governmental organizations that are not indigenous to Liberia and Sierra Leone. This notably 
includes all UN agencies, but excludes military-based actors such as the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL).  
The initial response by the international civilian community to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa has been widely perceived as slow and inadequate. While individual organisations 
have been singled out for blame, it must also be acknowledged that the current systems and 
processes that guide most international actors are not sufficiently developed or resourced to 
enable the rapid mobilisation of personnel and equipment in emergency contexts.6  
Moreover, as several respondents noted, 2014 was a particularly difficult year. Concurrent 
with the Ebola outbreak in West Africa were multiple category 3 (‘L3’) humanitarian 
emergencies in other locations, including Syria, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and 
Iraq as well as health crises of MERS-CoV, Polio and Avian Influenza H7N9.7 As a result, both 
non-government and intergovernmental organizations were stretched beyond their existing 
capacity and found it difficult to re-deploy personnel to Ebola-affected countries. This 
experience has several implications for emergency response and co-ordination. 
a) Emergency response capacity 
The international civilian humanitarian actor that most participants identified as responding in 
a timely and enduring manner to the 2014 Ebola outbreak was MSF. Local chapters of the 
Red Cross (supported by the American Red Cross), the Africa Governance Initiative (AGI), and 
Kings Sierra Leone Partnership were also identified by a small number of participants. In the 
context of MSF, which already had a small presence in Liberia and Sierra Leone undertaking 
anti-malaria work, the organization responded to the outbreak by converting existing facilities 
and re-tasking personnel to prioritize Ebola containment and treatment. The Red Cross focused 
on education and awareness raising, providing psychosocial support and safe burial 
practices.8 MSF also played a key advocacy role in alerting the international community to the 
uncontrolled nature of the crisis while arguing for more resources and personnel. In this context, 
the decision by MSF on 2 September 2014 to call for military intervention was identified by a 
number of participants as crucial to the overall response, with some suggesting that it provided 
a measure of legitimacy to the subsequent deployment of military forces given the 
organization’s well-documented opposition to military involvement in health-related activities. 
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Having said this, MSF was also criticised for being unduly demanding and, at times, difficult to 
work with. Some interviewees suggested, for example, that MSF held ‘unnecessarily high 
standards’, which were perceived to contribute to delays in the overall response.9 MSF was 
also reported to be unduly critical of other NGOs’ capacity to care for and treat Ebola 
patients, suggesting that only they had the ability to operate ETUs.10 MSF was also reportedly 
slow to respond in Sierra Leone. This may in part be explained by the fact that the 
organization was overwhelmed and lacked sufficient numbers of qualified staff, which 
corresponds with findings in a publicly available report.11  
By contrast, the WHO was often identified by respondents as having ‘failed’ the international 
community and the people of West Africa by not reacting swiftly enough to the crisis. This 
perception was widespread, and suggests that the organization’s reputation has been 
adversely undermined as a result of its alleged failure. It was also often cited as a reason why 
a stronger UN response was needed, although as explored below, views were also mixed on 
the benefit of UNMEER as well. While participants acknowledged that several independent 
reviews of the UN response (including WHO) are currently underway, they nevertheless 
identified that the WHO’s emergency response capacity warrants careful attention. 
For example, the WHO was seen to be overly protective of its reputation and avoided calling 
for international action earlier for fear of antagonizing the governments of Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. This view was particularly prevalent amongst a number of INGO and local 
respondents. Moreover, email correspondence from senior WHO officials published by 
Associated Press appears to confirm that these perceptions were accurate.12 Senior WHO 
officials interviewed for this study stressed that the organization responded appropriately to 
news of the initial outbreak in March 2014 by sending Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN) teams. It was acknowledged the organization’s response to the second 
wave of infections was inadequate, and as a result significant structural reform of the WHO is 
now reportedly underway.13   
Second, concerns were expressed by a small number of respondents regarding the quality of 
deployed WHO staff. At least two participants observed, for instance, that the WHO country 
director for Sierra Leone had been replaced three times between May 2014 and April 2015 
allegedly over their ability to manage the crisis.14 Other interviewees sought to counter such 
perceptions, noting that some of the appointments were only ever intended to be temporary 
and that the quality of staff was quite high overall.15 Either way, this suggests that the WHO 
may not have been sufficiently attuned to how the rotation of personnel would be perceived 
by the local population and/or partner organizations.  
In this context, it must also be acknowledged the WHO response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak 
is the largest emergency operation in the organization’s almost 70-year history.16 As such, it is 
perhaps understandable that the quality of personnel deployed to assist in containing Ebola 
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varied, especially when taking into account the urgent need to recruit new staff and deploy 
them to the affected areas. It must also be acknowledged that the rather rapid rotation of 
personnel was not limited to the WHO. Organizations like the US Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) were also observed to send personnel on a four-week rotational basis 
that reportedly proved very disruptive to local Sierra Leonean health workers.17 
More broadly, with the exception of MSF, the Red Cross and the King’s Sierra Leone 
Partnership most non-government and civil society actors also found that they were 
unprepared to respond to this outbreak. A number of respondents observed that their 
organizations lacked appropriately trained personnel to deal with a crisis precipitated by an 
infectious agent. Further, they lacked sufficient capacity to train personnel in infection control 
practices or manage demands for personal protective equipment. Instead, in several reported 
instances, local branches or missions were directed by their headquarters to cease operations 
and immediately withdraw their personnel to non-affected areas, even exiting the countries in 
which they were working entirely. In other instances, government-based development agencies 
(e.g. UK Department For International Development (DFID)) reportedly needed to resort to 
applying political and financial pressure on certain INGOs to ‘step up to the plate’, to ‘do their 
job’ and provide assistance.18 
Ebola was an unfamiliar threat that created fear in both the health and humanitarian sector. A 
number of respondents acknowledged that some humanitarian personnel were unwilling to 
deploy to an area where this infectious disease was spreading. One participant characterized 
this phenomenon as, ‘we had people lining up to get shot at in Syria, but we couldn’t get 
anyone to come to West Africa’.19 This reticence was especially acute given the level of 
publicity surrounding the morbidity and mortality associated with this virus. As one respondent 
remarked, ‘I don’t blame people for not wanting to come. This was Ebola, which is the world’s 
worst disease in terms of fatality rates’.20 
Military personnel expressed mixed views about the activities and actions of humanitarian 
agencies. Several military personnel singled out MSF as having performed its duties well in 
both Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, opinions were divided over the effectiveness and 
utility of other international humanitarian actors. For example, one officer remarked that he 
‘would have preferred if the NGOs did more to support us’ by ‘getting behind the mission’, as 
they appeared to be more preoccupied with ‘their reputation’. 21  Another interviewee 
remarked that the exodus of INGOs ceased only after it was announced that armed forces 
were deploying to West Africa - an observation that was confirmed by several 
representatives from humanitarian organizations themselves.  
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b) Coordination 
The UN Secretary General officially launched UNMEER on 19 September 2014, following the 
passage of UN Security Council resolution 2177(2014) declaring the Ebola outbreak an 
‘international threat to peace and security’ and the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 69/1.22 By January 2015, UNMEER had raised over USD$5.1 billion in donations.23 
The main function of UNMEER was co-ordination of the UN response to Ebola. It also acted as 
an emblem of high-level UN concern and commitment. The symbolic status of UNMEER and the 
politics of the UN will arguably see this mission framed as a success regardless of what it did 
or did not do. Nevertheless, the majority of participants outlined serious concerns with 
UNMEER.   
The first major critique of UNMEER was that it was not present in the Ebola response. It arrived 
too late, left too soon, and did not locate its official headquarters in any of the affected 
countries but instead was based in Accra, Ghana. The decision to be based in Accra was 
explained by one senior UN official in the following way: 
In many respects it was a classic military-style approach. You establish a forward 
operating base that you can retreat safely to if, or when, things go awry. And keep in 
mind that decision was taken in September when things were looking pretty dire. Even 
if [the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)] had been in charge it 
probably would have made the same decision, although it probably wouldn’t have 
been Accra that was chosen as the location.24 
In practice, however, respondents suggested this reflected a lack of confidence in the safety of 
the three affected countries. It also added to the impression that there were no UNMEER staff 
on the ground. As one respondent observed, ‘we have been told that [UNMEER staff] are here, 
but people hardly ever see them and we don’t really know what they do’.25 It was also 
observed that some UN staff were reluctant to deploy, since the mission was intended to be 
short-lived and it was unclear who would comprise the senior management team.26 
Furthermore, UNMEER took approximately 6-8 weeks to deploy sufficient personnel to West 
Africa. While this is relatively fast for the UN, other actors had already assumed a number of 
specific responsibilities and set up their own mechanisms of co-ordination before UNMEER 
arrived. In February 2015, it was also announced that the mission would cease operations by 
mid-2015. While it is understandable that UNMEER was meant to be short-lived, this 
announcement nevertheless took a number of agencies, staff, and partner organizations by 
surprise, and led to confusion as to who would takeover co-ordination as the outbreak 
continued in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea.  
A second major critique was that UNMEER did not use standard processes for humanitarian 
management and it had little expertise or experience in co-ordination. UNMEER viewed the 
outbreak as a public health emergency rather than an unfolding humanitarian disaster. This 
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perspective had several implications for co-ordination and leadership. The designation of 
UNMEER as a public health mission and its associated 30-60-90-day strategy for containing 
the outbreak was identified as having focused the organization too narrowly on health targets. 
This strategy informed the ‘4 Pillars’ framework that countries were encouraged to adopt,27 
and it facilitated a vertical or silo-style approach to addressing the crisis that was at odds with 
the now-commonly understood OCHA-led cluster framework. As one respondent observed, this 
disjuncture created considerable confusion amongst partners,  
We had some cluster arms stood up, others were partially stood up, but others were 
not stood up at all. What this meant… was that as organizations arrived to assist with 
the outbreak they had to work out where they could fit in and what activities they could 
do that weren’t already being done by other groups. It was all a bit of a mess.28 
By side lining the cluster framework in lieu of the 4 Pillars approach, some participants 
believed UNMEER ignored a number of the wider social and economic consequences arising 
from the outbreak, such as the impact on food security and emergency shelter, as well as non-
food items and protection (especially for survivors). Much of the criticism levelled against 
UNMEER was, perhaps unfairly, that it was not OCHA, or did not do what OCHA would have 
done based on previous humanitarian missions. In terms of technical assistance and 
coordination most participants observed that UNMEER brought little to ‘no added value’, with 
one respondent characterizing the organization as ‘only good for writing cheques’.29  
Added to this, while the creation of UNMEER was purported to assist with coordinating various 
UN agencies, the organization failed to provide regional leadership or coordination. Rather, 
the government of each affected territory was encouraged to take carriage of their own 
national response. Respondents noted that as a result, lessons learned were not shared and 
easily avoidable mistakes were repeated. While UNMEER may not have been explicitly 
commissioned to provide region-wide leadership (instead focusing on coordinating UN 
agencies) it was perceived to have not performed sufficiently as intended. 
 
Domestic Civilian Actors 
Domestic civilian/humanitarian actors in Sierra Leone and Liberia refer to both the government 
sector – the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (Sierra Leone)/Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (Liberia) - and the non-governmental sector, primarily national non-governmental 
organisations, community groups and social media.  
a) Emergency response capacity 
A key factor in the spread of the Ebola virus was the poor state of national healthcare systems 
throughout Liberia and Sierra Leone, which were characterized by inadequate infrastructure, a 
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lack of resources, poor surveillance capacity, and insufficient numbers of trained health 
workers. There was no domestic surge capacity to deal with a sudden onset health emergency, 
and, as news of high infection rates amongst health workers spread, what limited capacity 
existed collapsed entirely.  
As the outbreak continued to expand in mid-2014, the governments of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone enacted emergency contingency plans and established focal points to oversee their 
national response. However, both countries were overwhelmed and ultimately dependent on 
assistance from, among others, INGOs such as International Medical Corps, MSF, and AGI; 
development partners such as DFID and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID); local NGOs and civil society organizations; and ultimately, foreign and 
domestic military forces. 
b) Coordination 
When the outbreak spread to Liberia, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) 
established a national task force and expert committee to oversee the response. In July 2014, 
this structure was supplemented by a purpose-built incident management system (IMS), which 
was developed with assistance from the US CDC.30 The IMS, chaired by Assistant Minister for 
Health, the Hon. Tolbert Nyenswah, then served as the principal coordination mechanism for 
the national response, with daily meetings between its technical committee and partner 
organisations.
 
Figure 1: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Ebola response incident management system. Pillai 
S, et al (2014) Developing an Incident Management System to Support Ebola Response - Liberia, 
July-August 2014. MMWR, 63(41): 930-933. Used with permission. 
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This coordination framework was remarked upon by a number of respondents as particularly 
effective, since the MOHSW was widely perceived as leading and directing the national 
response effort. This leadership notably included the coordination (often via intermediary 
actors) of foreign armed forces as well as INGOs and domestic NGOs. In the case of the US 
military, for instance, it was repeatedly stressed that military personnel had been deployed in 
support of USAID, which was supporting the MOHSW. As a result, USAID would receive 
requests from the MOHSW via IMS meetings, and USAID would in turn direct US military 
activities. This approach ensured that external armed forces were kept at arms-length in 
Liberia while also avoiding the perception they were receiving orders from a foreign 
government. However, one notable exception to this trend appears to have been the Chinese 
military. While Chinese armed forces were responsible for running an ETU, their 
representatives reportedly attended IMS meetings infrequently.31  
The national response to Ebola followed a similar trajectory in Sierra Leone, but with some key 
differences. On 30 July 2014, Sierra Leone’s President, Dr Ernest Bai Koroma, established a 
presidential taskforce to oversee the national response and ordered the formation of the EOC, 
which was to be coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS). On 
29 August 2014, however, President Koroma dismissed the then-health minister and appointed 
the WHO country representative and Chief Medical Officer to co-chair the EOC.32 Less than 
three weeks later, the President disbanded the EOC and appointed the Minister for Defence, 
Major (Rrtd) Alfred Palo Conteh, as head of a newly formed National Ebola Response Centre 
(NERC).33  Following Major Conteh’s appointment, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
(RSLAF) assumed a much more prominent role in coordinating the national response. The RSLAF 
was supported by the British armed forces. A number of interviewees observed that the 
appointment of Major Conteh effectively side-lined the MOHS from further involvement in 
coordination.  
One reported weakness in national government responses across both countries was a 
pervasive lack of trust in government institutions.  Mistrust extended to the highest levels of 
government in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and it was often remarked that the only government 
sector to trust was in fact the military. This impeded the national response and coordination 
efforts in a number of important ways. Several communities in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
refused to believe that the Ebola outbreak was real, initially judging it to be part of a 
government conspiracy to secure new funding from Western donors. As the epidemic 
progressed, suspicion turned to the international community. Conspiracy theories soon emerged, 
for example, that Ebola had been intentionally introduced to depopulate West Africa for its 
mineral resources. Liberia and Sierra Leone also reportedly experienced isolated incidents of 
violence against government health workers and/or INGO representatives.  
Finally, an important but contentious domestic issue was the emergence of a formal and 
informal ‘Ebola economy.’ The formal element refers to the economy organised around hazard 
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pay for healthcare workers and burial teams. Hazard pay was a critical tool to motivate 
workers into risky and traumatic roles. However, such payments have distorted the pay scales 
and expectations of local healthcare workers, as well as those that were not employed in 
health-related activities before taking on these hazard roles (i.e. teachers). The informal 
aspect of the Ebola economy manifested in the overall cost increases for basic necessities and 
services. While international actors generally accepted this as the ‘cost of doing business’, the 
impact of over-pricing on local populations prompted the leaders of both Sierra Leone and 
Liberia to issue official statements, warning that perpetrators would be prosecuted.34  
 
Foreign Militaries 
‘Foreign military forces’ pertains to the involvement of all external military forces engaged in 
the Ebola response. This excludes the military forces of Liberia and Sierra Leone that will be 
discussed in the next section. 
a) Emergency response capacity 
Plans to deploy armed forces to West Africa where already well underway when MSF 
International President Joanna Liu called for military intervention at the UN Security Council in 
September 2014. As one interviewee confirmed, US military personnel were reportedly in 
Monrovia throughout August 2014 to consult with senior MOHSW officials on the nature and 
shape any military assistance would take.35 These consultations and an assessment by the US 
combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM) subsequently informed President Barack Obama’s 
announcement on 16 September 2014 that the US military (under Operation United 
Assistance) would be part of a wider US-led effort to contain the outbreak and reduce the 
broader social and economic impacts.36 Similar planning efforts were also being undertaken 
by the UK forces to assist authorities in Sierra Leone and facilitate the launch of Operation 
Gritrock the following month in October 2014.37  
As witnessed in a number of previous humanitarian crises, military actors frequently command 
significant and, in many respects, unparalleled logistical capacity compared to their civilian 
counterparts. The 2014 Ebola outbreak was revealed to be no different. A detailed summary 
of the various armed forces contributions is provided in Appendix B. Importantly, however, the 
deployment of 2,692 US military personnel (predominantly in Liberia),38 and some 750 UK 
military personnel in Sierra Leone, signified a firm commitment by their respective governments 
to support the affected countries halt the spread of Ebola. For example, the arrival of 
thousands of personnel accompanied by significant military hardware in Liberia was viewed 
by a number of Liberians that America ‘had come to help’.39 The symbolism was also remarked 
upon by others, with one UN official observing, ‘Had the Americans simply driven from the 
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airport through Monrovia to their base and not done another thing the mission would have 
been a success. It was a massive demonstration of goodwill’.40 Similar sentiments were also 
expressed by a number of Sierra Leoneans of the British military contribution.  
The majority of activities performed by UK and US military forces focused on constructing ETUs 
and training local health workers. By contrast, virtually all of the smaller military contingents 
deployed to Liberia and Sierra Leone provided some form of clinical care. The African Union, 
for instance, as part of Operation African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak (ASEOWA) 
deployed approximately 720 civilian and military health workers from Nigeria, Ethiopia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya to assist the affected countries.41 The Canadian 
military contribution, which was directed to support UK efforts in Sierra Leone, similarly 
comprised some 36 military health workers in total.42 Likewise, a large proportion of the 
German military assisting the German Red Cross in Liberia worked in the Severe Infection 
Temporary Treatment Unit (SITTU) treating non-EVD illnesses.43 Although no confirmation could 
be obtained from the Chinese authorities, a number of interviewees stated they believed the 
staff operating the Chinese-run ETUs in Monrovia and Freetown were also military.  
Most study participants regarded the involvement of armed forces in this context positively, 
even those who admitted that they were highly sceptical or otherwise averse to military 
engagement in health-related activities. The use of military aircraft was especially seen as 
critical to the response, and fed directly into public perceptions that the military had arrived in 
significant numbers to help. The deployment of other military assets though received mixed 
reviews. This notably included the UK’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Argus that was deployed to 
Sierra Leone, with a number of respondents stating they believed it was an unnecessary and 
costly exercise. Others stated they were ambivalent, while at least one respondent suggested 
that it served as a reassurance tool during a difficult time.  
The largest criticisms of the US and UK military contribution pertained to the parameters of 
their respective missions. As documented by MSF in their 2015 evaluation report, it had been 
anticipated that when calling for military assistance, governments would respond by sending 
large numbers of personnel capable of providing ‘hands on’ clinical care and assistance, as 
well as personnel skilled in biohazard containment.44 But in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
respondents found that their expectation of what the foreign militaries would deliver was quite 
different from what they had expected. Many also expressed concerns with respect to the 
length of time it took for military forces to arrive, observing the bulk of personnel did not 
arrive until late October or early November.  
Related to the above, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone respondents expressed frustration at 
the pace with which ETU facilities were built by militaries (an average of approximately 3 
months) in comparison with INGO-built facilities (an average of two to five weeks).  As one 
interviewee stated, ‘If we were ever to see this again, I have to say that it would be more 
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appropriate for the military to erect tents in the first instance. We needed beds fast, not high 
spec buildings. They could have been built later’.45 High-level specifications, building codes 
and safety standards were regularly cited as the cause of these delays. In this, however, the 
delays should not necessarily be attributed as the fault of the military per se, but rather the 
prescriptive standards set by their respective governments. A number of incidents were 
reported where either poor design of the proposed ETU, the utilization of local contractors 
and/or the use of inferior building materials led to construction delays, resulting in some 
instances where the entire facility had to be rebuilt. 
Several interviewees were also critical of the military’s perceived avoidance to risk, which 
reportedly manifested through the confinement of large numbers of military personnel to their 
barracks. One senior military officer attempted to counter such perceptions by noting that the 
deployment of any large military force always requires a sizeable contingent of support staff, 
the majority of whom had no frontline role. 46  A further point of concern flagged by 
interviewees was an apparent divergent perspective on care and treatment. This ranged from 
the refusal of the US military to airlift suspected Ebola patients or specimens, an alleged ‘no 
touch care’ policy by the UK military (see below), and a perceived difference in treatment 
protocols between the Sierra Leone military-run Hastings ETU and the British military-run Kerry 
Town Military Medical Unit (MMU). Public perceptions of Kerry Town were greatly affected 
when it was reported that Sierra Leone’s Dr Martin Salia had been turned away from the 
MMU and subsequently died of Ebola after being evacuated to the US (see below). Several 
respondents remarked how this contrasted markedly with their expectations about what the 
military would do, although some also acknowledged that this perhaps reflected a level of 
naivety and unfamiliarity with the military on their part. UK and US military officials noted that 
such actions were entirely consistent with standard expectations of force protection and their 
mission parameters.  
Having said this, there appears to be considerable confusion regarding certain events and 
measures. For example, it was widely reported by interviewees in Freetown that the UK 
military had promoted a ‘no touch care’ policy, and yet no documented evidence of this policy 
can be located. Senior UK military health professionals that were deployed to Freetown have 
denied the existence of such a policy,47 while some interviewees characterized the care 
provided by the UK military medical team in Sierra Leone as the highest quality medical care 
of all responders. Related to this, while the UK military has attracted criticism for turning away 
Dr Salia, it has been reported that it was actually a local security firm that denied the doctor 
entry to the compound; and that once the UK military had been made aware of the doctor’s 
condition they immediately made a bed available for him.48 What this suggests is that 
countering misinformation, irrespective of whether the responders are civilian or military-based 
actors, is critical to ensure misunderstanding between actors is minimized and the broader 
humanitarian response is not adversely affected. 
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b) Coordination 
The arrival of both US and UK militaries had a number of direct and indirect impacts on 
coordination efforts, and arguably serves as one of the most significant contributions to the 
overall response effort.  
In terms of the indirect impacts, while it was repeatedly stressed that the US military had been 
deployed in support of USAID, a number of observers noted that their arrival in Liberia 
encouraged a more ‘professional’ response by INGOs and domestic military personnel. A 
similar dynamic was observed in Sierra Leone. A number of respondents attributed this to the 
strong historical ties that exist between the US and Liberia, and the UK and Sierra Leone, 
including established military-to-military relationships involving officer training and personnel 
exchange programs.49  
In more direct terms, the arrival of the foreign military forces stimulated the adoption of highly 
structured command and control arrangements that explicitly followed military protocols in 
each country’s national response. In Sierra Leone, although ostensibly deployed to assist DFID 
coordinate the response, the UK military played a very prominent role in assuming command 
of the national response between October and December 2014. The British military reportedly 
began to ‘step back’ from coordinating the NERC meetings by late December 2014, 
encouraging RSLAF personnel to assume more of the leadership roles.  This contrasted with the 
Liberian experience where the MOHSW was visibly in charge of the national response, even 
as it adopted a military-style approach to coordinating its IMS meetings and was being 
supported by armed forces.  
On a practical, day-to-day level, most respondents found the military open, engaging, and 
keen to learn. However, in Sierra Leone, the co-ordination meetings in the NERC and 
Commander Unit Briefings (CUB) were seen by some respondents as particularly militarised 
and masculine spaces. In both contexts there was little provision made for questions, discussion 
or opportunities to challenge the direction outlined by military leaders. This, combined with the 
fact the majority of speakers were men, was perceived to lead to a shrinking of space for 
people to admit failure in specific areas, or those with expertise beyond the military to speak 
up about issues that they did not agree with.  
An additional limitation of the military was the creation of new committees within the NERC 
system that replicated existing domestic structures, particularly at the local level. Specifically, 
District Ebola Response Centres (DERCs) replicated much of the work of the District Medical 
Offices and for some could have been assimilated within existing arrangements. Others 
argued a separate entity was necessary to upscale the response.  
The approach taken in each country highlights an apparent divergence in doctrine between US 
and UK approaches to civil-military cooperation. In Liberia, the US military were resolute that 
they remained separate from both the AFL and civilian arrangements, working behind the 
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scenes in support of USAID (albeit very prominently given the presence of almost 3,000 
personnel). In contrast, the approach taken by the British military within Sierra Leone was to 
integrate and embed personnel within RSLAF and, at least in the initial months following their 
arrival, assume coordination of the national response in all but name. Despite these 
differences, a common assertion was that, without the military, Ebola would not have been 
contained.  
 
Domestic Militaries 
Domestic militaries refers exclusively to the Armed Forces of Liberia, (AFL) and the Republic of 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces, (RSLAF). 
a) Emergency response capacity 
The use of domestic militaries for responding to disasters or civil emergencies is a common 
practice throughout West Africa.50 Domestic militaries are not only the ‘last resort’ but, in many 
circumstances, they are the only available option for governments to respond to crises. In 
Sierra Leone, for example, RSLAF had previously worked alongside public health officials 
during the 2012 cholera outbreak, which suggests that these forces already had an 
established reputation for assisting in health-related crises. That being said, domestic militaries 
were not immediately called upon to assist with national Ebola response efforts and were only 
engaged in Liberia and Sierra Leone in mid-2014.  
b) Coordination 
By August 2014 the scale of the outbreak was such that military forces in both Liberia and 
Sierra Leone were deployed to assist in response. In Sierra Leone, RSLAF assumed a prominent 
role in coordinating the national response following the appointment of defence minister as 
director of the NERC. RSLAF was perceived to have filled a void created by the overwhelmed 
and poorly functioning MOHS, as well as the relatively inactive and ill-equipped Office for 
National Security.  
This contrasted notably with the experience of Liberia, where the MOHSW assumed command 
of the national response and where the military were relegated to a support function, 
particularly following the West Point incident (see below). While senior military officers would 
often attend IMS meetings and provide regular updates, the MOHSW took the lead in 
directing efforts and coordinating the various international and domestic actors. Given these 
differences, it should perhaps come as no surprise that the general consensus amongst Sierra 
Leonean respondents was that the situation would have been much worse if the military had 
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not stepped in, whereas in Liberia the intervention of foreign military forces, and specifically 
the US, were seen as the decisive factor for the response proving successful. 
Both the AFL and RSLAF undertook a variety of activities: In Liberia, for instance, the AFL 
Engineering Company worked alongside US military engineers to build four ETUs,51 and they 
assisted with extending a remote airstrip to help deploy more logistical equipment.52 Similar 
activities were also undertaken in Sierra Leone where RSLAF staffed checkpoints, enforced 
quarantine, and assisted with the removal and safe burial of Ebola victims.53 In these activities, 
the majority of respondents drew clear distinctions between their respective military and police 
forces, indicating that military personnel were generally seen as more honest and trustworthy. 
Several interviewees in each country stated how proud they were of their military, noting that 
they had undergone significant reform and restructuring in the wake of earlier conflicts.  
This pride notwithstanding, several respondents in both Sierra Leone and Liberia also noted 
that they followed the instructions of the military out of fear for their personal safety and the 
safety of their loved ones. It was not uncommon for respondents to recall memories of the civil 
war and past atrocities committed by both armed forces and ‘sobels’ (soldier-rebels) when 
discussing the participation of the military in the Ebola response. Some respondents failed to 
understand why military personnel carried guns and were dressed in combat fatigues if they 
were ‘fighting’ a disease. Stories were also recounted of people fleeing their homes after the 
military imposed quarantine,54 while a small number of respondents reported isolated incidents 
of alleged low-level violence to enforce lockdown periods and ensure the safe closure of ETUs. 
For some in Sierra Leone, this low-level but state-sanctioned violence was perceived as the 
norm and a necessary form of heavy-handedness. Importantly, however, it raises a difficult 
question about how violence or the threat of force can be sanctioned in response to health 
emergencies. 
The most prominent example that respondents identified as a cause for concern was the West 
Point ‘incident’. On 19 August 2014, Liberia’s President ordered the quarantine and isolation 
of Monrovia’s West Point community following an earlier disturbance when an Ebola isolation 
centre was ransacked (freeing patients, as well as removing infected bedding and other 
materials).55 Overnight, and at the direction of the President, the AFL moved in to establish 
roadblocks so that residents of the community awoke the next day to find that they were 
unable to leave the area. Tensions emerged, leading to protests. While attempting to quell a 
local riot, a 15-year old boy was shot in the leg and bleed to death due to concerns that he 
may have been infected. An inquiry was launched, but this event was noted to have profound 
implications in not only undermining the reputation of the AFL throughout Liberia, but 
respondents in Sierra Leone also cited the West Point incident as evidence of the risk of 
violence from security services. 
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The West Point incident, combined with the shooting of two civilians by the Sierra Leone Police 
in Kono district in October 2014,56 exemplify the worst fears of security sector involvement in 
health-related activities. In the wake of the West Point incident, Liberia’s President admitted 
that the deployment of the AFL and police had been an error that ‘created more tension in the 
society’.57 The incident clearly had a wider impact across the region, and within Liberia, can be 
partially attributed with the reduced visibility of the AFL in the broader national Ebola 
response. In Sierra Leone, the shooting of the two civilians in Kono district allegedly 
exacerbated mistrust in the national police, but did not appear to affect the level of 
confidence in RSLAF.58  Further, by contrast to Liberia the utilization of security services 
personnel - including the police - in containing Ebola across Sierra Leone has continued at the 
time of writing.59 In both countries, however, political leaders have suggested that there is a 
need to train their domestic security services to be better prepared in the future to deliver 
humanitarian assistance, including in peacekeeping operations.60 
 
Key Themes/Recommendations 
A system-wide review of, and investment in, crisis response systems 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa revealed that the existing international crisis 
response system is currently inadequate. It also revealed that in the absence of robust health 
systems at the domestic level and timely humanitarian interventions at the international level, 
civil-military cooperation can prove both critical and decisive in responding to health-related 
humanitarian crises. Military personnel often bring essential skills and capabilities that can be 
leveraged to successfully augment civilian efforts. While there is a need to ensure that the 
military is called upon sparingly as a last resort, the Ebola outbreak has demonstrated that 
there is a need to move beyond traditional opposition to military involvement in health-related 
emergencies. A systematic review that includes civil-military cooperation is therefore 
warranted. 
Upon completion of such a review, it is also imperative that governments act in addressing 
identified capacity gaps by investing in health systems, preparedness, coordination and 
response. The poor state of health infrastructure within the countries most severely affected by 
Ebola was well known prior to 2014. In repeated evaluations and assessments, it had been 
identified that Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia lacked health system capacities capable of 
responding to acute public health emergencies, irrespective of their potential for international 
spread or not. This fact highlights yet again the need for strengthening national health systems, 
and the need for significant investment in building the disease surveillance and response 
capacities identified in frameworks such as the revised International Health Regulations (2005).  
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Internationally, that so few organizations were prepared for responding to an emergency of 
this nature reveals yet another set of core weaknesses within existing arrangements. This 
highlights the need for far more training in health disaster management and preparedness. In 
addition, the number of suitably qualified personnel capable of responding at short notice is 
far too small. This is particularly acute given the frequency with which disease-related events 
are occurring. In this respect, the 2014 Ebola outbreak presents a timely opportunity to refocus 
attention on addressing overall capacity for responding to acute public health crises at both 
the national and international level.  
Recommendation 1: That the terms of reference for the United Nations High-Level Panel on Global 
Response to Health Crises be expanded to include civil-military cooperation as part of the broader 
review of the international crisis response system. 
Recommendation 2: Substantial international investment - informed by empirical evidence and 
frameworks such as the International Health Regulations (2005) - must be immediately scaled-up 
to address existing capacity gaps in disaster management and outbreak response. 
Recommendation 3: Governments should cite the 2014 Ebola outbreak to advocate for greater 
resources to address the capacity gaps in their national health systems. This includes leveraging 
support from international actors to secure the requisite technical and financial support to build 
local capacity. 
 
Framing an event at the outset is critical to successful co-ordination 
How an event is framed or described shapes the type of response that is elicited. When an 
issue is labelled a health concern it triggers a response from actors involved in the health 
sector: health ministries, the WHO, the World Bank, a range of INGOs and academic health 
specialists. When an event is identified as a humanitarian disaster, it provokes a different 
response, primarily organised around the OCHA with the involvement of humanitarian 
agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), humanitarian INGOs, and in some 
instances, domestic and foreign militaries.  
The challenge with the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was that it was initially 
characterized and framed as a health problem, as opposed to being identified as a 
humanitarian crisis from the outset. The health framing made sense at the time: Ebola outbreaks 
are not uncommon and previous outbreaks have been contained by timely public health 
interventions. The scale and location of the 2014 outbreak in West Africa, however, combined 
with the inadequate health systems in the affected countries caused the outbreak to rapidly 
transform into a larger humanitarian crisis.  
Unfortunately, the full extent and nature of the outbreak was not understood in sufficient time, 
and even when it later was, decision-makers persisted in viewing the crisis predominantly 
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through a health lens. As such, the structures and processes for responding to humanitarian 
disasters that have been developed and refined since 2005 were not activated. Instead, a 
new ‘4 pillar’ framework focused around specific public health measures was implemented. 
This system was untried, facilitated ‘vertical’ activities while discouraging cross-sectoral 
collaboration, created confusion, and it often failed to consider the wider social and economic 
implications of the event. The 2014 Ebola outbreak thus revealed the importance of 
anticipating and correctly framing an adverse event early on, as these ideas determine and 
inform the subsequent response, including the organisations, leadership and co-ordination to 
used address the crisis.  
Recommendation 4: Framing an issue as a health crisis should not preclude multi-sectoral 
collaboration with humanitarian and if necessary military actors, and, when a health crisis becomes 
a humanitarian crisis the health aspect should not be lost. 
 
Civil-military cooperation in health-related humanitarian crises should 
remain context-specific 
There is danger in viewing the 2014 Ebola outbreak as a simple blueprint for future civil-
military cooperation. This is principally because the countries most severely affected by the 
virus possessed a long history of post-conflict reconstruction and military-to-military 
cooperation in the wake of their respective civil wars. Such extensive cooperation and 
historical engagement is not common though, and as a result, the high level of goodwill 
extended towards foreign military forces during the 2014 outbreak in West Africa may not 
be easily replicated in other contexts. 
There is also a genuine need to consider the long-term implications of the Ebola response on 
civil-military cooperation in health. The call for military intervention in September 2014 and 
the concomitant and overt collaboration with foreign military personnel highlights longstanding 
and contentious questions about the neutrality and independence of humanitarian 
organizations. Perceived independence from both domestic and foreign militaries is often 
assumed to be a key pillar of humanitarian work. The call for military intervention and 
subsequent collaboration has further ‘blurred the lines’ between government, military and 
humanitarian work.  
The experience of the 2014 Ebola outbreak thereby suggests that civil-military cooperation in 
health-related humanitarian crises needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis as to 
whether it is appropriate. Situational awareness of the political, economic and social history of 
each event is essential and should be carefully reviewed and considered prior to the launch of 
any international response. It is considered unlikely, for example, that a foreign military would 
be received positively as part of a health mission in countries where the same military had 
previously engaged in hostile actions against domestic armed forces and/or local populations.  
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Having said this, it is acknowledged that when lives are at stake the temptation of 
governments and the international community will be to utilize any and all measures to prevent 
harm. Accordingly, there is a genuine need for further work to be undertaken prior to the next 
health-related humanitarian crisis to enable each event to be assessed independently and 
impartially, absent of the imperative for immediate action. Establishing what principles and 
parameters should guide civil-military cooperation in health-related humanitarian crises must 
be accomplished in a non-emergency context. 
Recommendation 5: Develop additional evidence-informed criteria to facilitate multi-level risk 
assessments that can be used to guide civil-military responses to health-related humanitarian crises 
so as to avoid exacerbating the risks of harmful and unintended consequences.  
 
Increased awareness of expectations, perceptions and understanding, based 
on research and informed by training 
There is a genuine need for greater awareness and understanding of the relationship between 
humanitarian and military actors. Despite decades of civil-military cooperation in other 
contexts, the Ebola outbreak demonstrated that there remains considerable confusion about 
how militaries operate amongst humanitarian actors and vice versa. Developing realistic 
expectations of the various roles and functions that military and civilian actors can perform, 
specifically in the health sector, and what they cannot or should not do is essential to inform 
any future emergency response efforts.  
Consequently, there is a critical need for further research to be commissioned and overseen by 
independent organizations to identify when, why, and how military personnel are called upon 
to assist civilian efforts in health-related humanitarian crises. Much more work in identifying 
when it is appropriate to engage military actors as a last resort is required. This includes 
studying the impact of military participation in activities ranging from quarantine and isolation, 
to security, to clinical care, and whether in fact they should play a role in these type of 
activities. Moreover, as the Ebola crisis revealed, there is an urgent need for increased training 
of military and civilian personnel prior to performing their respective duties so that errors and 
adverse outcomes are minimized. 
Recommendation 6: The United Nations commissions a five-year independent research program 
that systematically investigates the roles and functions that military-based actors can perform in 
collaboration with civilian authorities in health-related humanitarian crises to inform future practice. 
Recommendation 7: The United Nations develop in collaboration with leading non-government and 
humanitarian agencies a training program for military and civilian actors to enhance preparedness, 
build awareness, and ensure greater reciprocal understanding of appropriate roles, principles and 
practices for responding to health-related humanitarian crises.  
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Acronyms 
AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia 
AFRICOM United States Africa Command 
AGI  Africa Governance Initiative 
C&C  Command-and-control 
CUB  Commander Unit Briefing 
DART  Disaster Assistance Relief Team 
DERC  District Ebola Response Centre 
DFID  Department for International Development 
ETU  Ebola Treatment Unit 
GOARN Global Outbreak and Response Network  
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
IMATT  International Military Advisory and Training Team  
IMS  Incident Management System (Liberia) 
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation 
ISAT  International Security Advisory Team 
MOD  Ministry of Defence (UK) 
MODNS Ministry of Defence and National Security (Sierra Leone) 
MOHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Liberia) 
MOOTW Military Operation Other Than War 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NERC  National Ebola Response Centre (Sierra Leone) 
OCHA  Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
RFA  Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
RSLAF  Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
SITTU  Severe Infection Temporary Treatment Unit 
SOPs  Standard Operating Procedures 
UN  United Nations 
UNMEER  United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response  
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Appendix A 
Research Questions 
 
1. Can you please briefly outline your professional background/experience and the 
nature of any current duties that require close cooperation with civilian/military 
organizations in the current Ebola outbreak? 
2. How would you characterize the current level of civil-military cooperation in 
responding to Ebola in this country / your organization / your unit? (e.g. well 
developed/formalized/minimal/non-existent) 
3. In your current role, what type of activities would you identify as civil-military 
cooperation? (e.g. disease outbreak surveillance and response, construction of 
facilities, coordination of personnel, etc)  
4. What are the key benefits, in your view, of civil-military cooperation in this current 
outbreak? Where have military (or civilian) assistance/personnel really made a 
difference? How and why? 
5. In your view, are there any drawbacks to this type of cooperation? If so, what is the 
nature of these drawbacks? Where are the limits of civil-military cooperation in 
responding to complex health emergencies? 
6. In your opinion, are there any risks/challenges associated with civil-military 
cooperation in this current outbreak? If so, how have these risks/challenges been 
addressed/managed?  
7. How is trust being built between organisations? What steps/measures have been 
taken to improve the working relationship between your organisation and 
civilian/military personnel?  
8. What is the nature and extent of any arrangements between the military/your 
organization and the country in which you are currently/formerly working? (e.g. 
formal MOU, informal networks, individual links, etc)  
9. To what extent would you recommend that civil-military cooperation be replicated in 
future complex health emergencies? 
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Appendix B 
 
  
Country/ Organisation 
 
Contribution 
 
USA  UK  A.U.  Canada  MSF  Germany 
African  
Dev'pt 
Bank  
Save the 
Children WB  Total 
           
  
Military Personnel  
 
2,692 750 540 36 - - 540 - - 4,558 
ETU Beds (treatment and 
isolation)  1,700 1,400 200 - - - - 270 - 3,570 
Naval Vessels  
 
20 1 - - - - - - - 21 
Military Aircraft  
 
85 3 - - - - - - - 88 
Vehicles  
 
- 20 - - - - - - - 20 
ETU 
 
15 - - - 15 - - 4 - 34 
PPE 
 
- - - - 530,000 - - - - 530,000 
Trained 
 
- 4,000 - - >1,000  - - 1,957 - 5,957 
Spend (US Dollars)  
 
$921m $678m - $88m $67m $220m $220m $0m $1,620m $3,814m 
National Staff 
 
- - - - 4,000 - - - - 4,000 
Labs  
 
- 3 
 
2 - - - - - 5 
International Civilian 
personnel  
 
10,000 1,000 835 - 1,300 71 - - - 13,206 
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